Governance really evil type chaebol chain?

 Governance really evil type chaebol chain?

The value of carbon chain (ID:cc-value), the author: Lanre Ig, Morpho Hawkes, Diana compiler: the daily planet authorized forwarding.

Last week, BCH bifurcation of the war, so that people have a psychological shadow on the security of the world POW. We see a joke: EOS center, in the hands of 21 super node BCH hands; only the last master in a few hands. More people bitcoin Jesus Roger said: Roger, you showed us how to attack the BCH network, you only need one of your fingertips on it.

This is the natural DPOS supporters as a joke. DPOS is a kind of typical governance chain, the beginning of many times people write article said that the chain will last to the chaebol corruption governance. Of course, we are now in the EOS has seen, here not elaborate. While BTC and BCH is a typical chain management, rely on the miners to vote in the decision-making chain. At the beginning of the year had said, chain governance than chain governance more secure, now is not.

We in the BCH bifurcation after raised the question: who to restrict these powerful miners? Who will defend the POW world Chibidaigou interests? In the DPOS world, and someone asked: increasing the benefits can be defended, who will defend the developers and users interests?

But today we push this article is sent to these problems are given. It is worth mentioning that this writing in 7 2018, before the bifurcation.

In this paper, the goal and the significance

Last year, people wrote many important articles against governance “chain”. The blog is particularly important among them, an author is Vlad Zamfir (link:, a Vitalik Buterin is the author (link:, summarizes all kinds of argument chain governance in morality and technology. The basic idea is that the chain management will degenerate into plutocracies (plutocracies system, also is to have rich people to govern society). This paper tries to clarify some governance related chain concept, and assist in the analysis, whether all chain governance is plutocracies, or will become plutocracies; if this is the case, then the plutocracies is necessarily a bad thing?

Some of the important concept of governance in the first senior section outlines the blockchain, then will focus on the idea of “governance is plutocracies” chain argument. The final list of several types of “save the chain for governance not degenerate plutocracies” program.

Richard Red wrote an excellent article, discuss the plutocracies and block chain management. (link: we recommend that you read this before you take a look at this article, the two have some intersection; but it is also the one inspired us to write this article.

Block chain management

The voting block chain management and chain, in recent months is a hot topic in the industry, especially in the 0x MakerDAO, so the governance structure is designed to develop their own ecosystem with the continuity of the project came out. In addition, after EOS this chain management block chain released unsatisfactory, Tezos (another type of block chain management) will be released, these events also let us know how important it is to control the topic.

Our definition of block chain governance are as follows:

“Public community and major stakeholders (key stakeholders) to realize the way of collective action, especially those of the agreement on the revision of the collective action.”

A block chain management dialogue, will generally be divided into two kinds of Governance: governance chain and chain management.

Chain Governance: a process of governance, decision-making in the social level (chain), and then by the developers in the block chain protocol implementation. Typical such as bitcoin, Ethernet square.

Chain Governance: a governance process, all the rules, voting, choice of encoding (chain) into hard block chain protocol. Such as Tezos, EOS. typical democratic voting system, based on the “one vote” system. The chain by means of voting and governance is often regarded as plutocracy. Based on the chain management system, is a specific address with “native tokens” (native tokens, also with “management agreement” to maintain a consistent number of tokens).

Ordinary chain voting system will use the “one vote” policy, a variant or “one vote” policy, such as the two party vote (quadratic voting). In view of the identity system currently does not go to the center of the can in the chain of voting to realize “one vote”, the existing system usually is about it. However, the complexity of the chain of voting system often more than a simple “one person one vote” system. Someone holds tokens, even said that the increasing number exceeds a certain threshold, also can not get the vote; that is DASH and the “master node governance” of the situation.

VS protocol application level management

We have to distinguish between governance block chain based on protocol level (Protocol-level governance) and the application of governance governance (Application-level governance).

I) protocol level Governance: governance scope is for a specific block chain protocol (such as Ethernet square, bitcoin) of various modifications. This treatment previously chain, but the recent agreement on the chain increased level of governance.

II): the application level of governance measures and internal mechanism of various application block chain based on correlation. For example, a user in a decentralized video sharing program to see the video, users can vote for the video, or use a “token select Registry” (Token-Curated Registry, referred to as TCR) voting vote.

This distinction is important because the charged chain vote “plutocracies”, accused plutocracies of bad, the two charges against the protocol level is often, but not necessarily the application level.

Block chain governance and plutocracies

At the beginning of Vlad Zamfir and Vitalik Buterin said, have written articles about dangerous block chain governance and plutocracies, I have attached a link. This article provides a basis for argument, block chain management system against plutocracies:

Vlad: Chibidaigou and blockchain users, their interests are not consistent.

Vitalik: plutocracies / chain management plan, to “attack vector” open protocol, such as bribery and voting for many attacks.

We can review these perspectives. The basic argument 1 is a kind of special governance idea, namely “as public property blockchain (Blockchains-as-a-Public-Good, BaaPG). Vlad said:

“Based on the currency (coin-based) chain management, with the interests of users is not consistent; and this kind of public governance and the whole idea of the blockchain draw further apart. Crypto currency holding, as global social wealth is highly concentrated in the hands of a handful of people. Block chain should not be owned by anyone…… Not to mention a handful of rich.”

BaaPG, the protocol level governance bitcoin, Ethernet network for this workshop, is indeed tenable. The network is said to the center, which means there is no central authority to control the network, access to the network does not need a permit.

With this view, block chain and global public property does have in common. Several definitions of global public property:

A) non competitive (Non-rivalry): any consumption of this property, do not reduce the number of other agents can use the property.

B) nonexcludability (Non-excludability): it is not possible to prevent any person from consumption of this property.

C) availability (Availability): this property to a certain extent, the world can be.

One can think of bitcoin, this square block chain Ethernet to meet the standard B and C, but obviously does not meet the standard of A. If there is a rich user, are willing to pay more than the average price of gas, it can prevent the less money than his user interaction and intelligent contract in the etheric square block chain; and the global public property, such as real air, but obviously this is not the case. Nevertheless, people intuitively think block chain and global public property has some similarities; may be more suitable for the chain block is defined as “common pool resources” (common-pool resources).

We say about 2 points. Based on the 2 argument is the chain voting mechanism vulnerable to bribery attack. Phil Daian et al recently issued an article on the chain of bribery, this situation is summarized as follows:

“The chain of voting mechanism further complicates the incentive measures, making a group of chaos and instability of the incentive measures. These measures can intelligent contracts are not trusted to amend or “dark web distributed self-organizing style” (Dark DAO-style) vote buying behavior modification, or bribe modification, malicious destruction mechanism (griefing schemes) modification. We suggest that community members suspected of any chain voting results, especially when the chain becomes the most important step of voting decision more doubt. The process design of the mechanism, to provide a great space for new kinds of abuse, abuse and coordination costs low to hitherto unknown. This supports our claim: voting should be used to provide signal rather than the decision, and there are many kinds of voting mechanism are such a role to be played.”

The chain of voting mechanism currently vulnerable to attack damage and bribery; bribery against the act itself seems to be a plutocracy, because of rich and wealthy institutions (easily) of a block chain management process control, control range to disproportionate. Associated with the governance process of bribery attacks can, may lead to negative results. For example, if a block chain is completely separate control mechanism or cartel, this institution or cartel could hurt the block chain and the long-term interests of users.

Vitalik said the above argument 2 — a block chain management concept of BaaPG, which also implied the idea. The argument that, a majority of individual cash, still may not be the most ideal, because other users may become significant sources of poverty; this view seems to be an earlier belief: “Chibidaigou is not the only important stakeholders” (PaaBG view).

As the chain management and plutocracies Oliver

Some people do not agree with those who opposed the above block chain governance “plutocracies” argument. They may put forward the following theory:

First, governance is not plutocracies advocate chain.

Second, advocate all or part of the block chain block chain is not public property.

Third, advocate chain chain voting and voting as vulnerable to attack.

The chain of vote = plutocracies (?)

According to the argument that “chain governance is plutocracies, the easiest retort is:” loose coupling vote “(loosely coupled voting) makes the chain governance to avoid plutocracies. Vitalik Buterin distinguishes two forms of chain voting (modalities):

The first is the “close coupling vote” (Tightly-coupled voting), this kind of change is also voted for is binding.

The second is the “loose coupling vote” is only the equivalent of a voting behavior and coordination tools, there is no change in binding.

All the specific execution chain of voting, the equivalent of a continuum, one end is the coupling of the most dense, the other side is the most loose coupling. The relatively loose coupling of the voting mechanism is less dependent on a specific “currency vote” (coin vote), and more dependent on other social signals.

After the DAO Carbon Vote:DAO hack carbon, held a vote, decide whether to Ethernet square community branch, to back the lost money. The vote is not constraint effect, purely in order to measure the ETH holder’s emotions and choice. This may be used to block the chain, the chain on the loose coupling of vote.

 Governance really evil type chaebol chain?

Dexin coin tokens (Decred) governance: Decred (PoW) by mixing work proof and proof of interest (PoS) blocks to create mechanisms to control network. Proof of interest contributors (stakeholders), can effectively control over proof of the contributors (miners); the condition is a specific block of stakeholders for more than 60% of the vote against one of the miners created.

When the Decred stakeholder ticket (Ticket) when they said this ticket will how to use the above in any open issues. In addition, the stakeholders to buy tickets at the same time, it will lock their Decred tokens, until these tickets have been selected to participate in the vote. Decred block creation in the proof of work parts, will help ensure that certain parts of the chain under the Decred governance process, resulting in the voting process a more loosely coupled; in the next few months, this situation, through the voting system of “Decred Politeia” was released in the network to maintain.

0x management plan of the (link: 0x governance process is still in the design, but the link of “overview of the high-level thinking of 0x project management. To the center of the governance of the show for the first time there are two initial stages, respectively is: first, first management by the community responsible for the registry records of all tokens, tokens and the exchange rate. Second, community (Community Veto Power) veto. These two suggestions are examples of voting loose coupling chain, because these two suggestions are dependent on the chain of tools to create a social consensus, and then vote on the chain.

 Governance really evil type chaebol chain?

Governance research Roadmap

The time line from left to right: today; the June 2018 launch of 0x protocol version second released in 2019; the 0x token registry passes select Registry (TCR) released in June 2019; the community veto; released 2020 (Liquid democracy) flow of democracy.

The grey blocks from top to bottom: select the registry certificate; community veto; flow of democracy; economic modeling (cryptoeconomics modeling) encryption, chain block chain cross voting; governance.

Explanation: 0x governance roadmap. Source:

A vote on the chain of examples also are dependent on the chain management. There can help avoid these systems fall into plutocracies governance chain, because the holder is no longer become tokens as the only standard system of decision makers.

Block chain and public property (?)

As we said before (BaaPG), the public block chain does not currently meet global public product standards. However, this may change in the future.

With the increase of interoperability between the extension and the block chain block chain, using block chain may become less competitive. This is similar to the internet. With the passage of time, people use the Internet has reduced competition, even said that almost no competition. Because of the improvement such as fiber optic cables and more efficient routing protocol of the physical infrastructure, reduce the possibility of significant congestion during peak hours.

If we do not take the blockchain as public property, “the chain of voting is plutocracies charges that are not so meaningful. If the block chain is the users to pay for private goods, so that “pay more people on the property more control” is logical.

Block chain is more like a common pool of resources: a system composed of natural resources or man-made resources system products (such as irrigation systems or fisheries). The system has the characteristics of scale or, make people to exclude those who benefit from the potential benefits of using it will pay a high cost, although not impossible to exclude.

On how to achieve the common pool resource management, there have been a large number of documents, such as: Adams, WOCAT, Agrawal., however, this topic is beyond the scope of this discussion. But we believe that if the block chain is regarded as a common pool of resources, change the kind of “governance” against the chaebol type chain on the moral argument. The original argument is “block chain as a kind of public property by the chaebol control, is not fair”; the new argument is “block chain as a common pool of resources, is the chaebol control is not sustainable”.

 Governance really evil type chaebol chain?

The top title: Chain Governance and plutocracies oliver.

On the left side of the red Title: chain vote = plutocracy.

The text below: chain voting is a continuum, one end is closely coupled to vote, the other end is loosely coupled to vote. The relatively more loosely coupled voting version, that can resist plutocracies.

Intermediate title: blue chain alone can not buy votes vote.

The text below: chain voting can also be bribery attack. The miners can accept bribes and digs into certain types of transactions, or a kind of special digging block chain. If someone because an attacker can buy votes against the chain voting system, then he would certainly think that the chain chain more easily than bribery bribery; but it is not completely clear.

On the right side of the Yellow Title: block chain and public property.

The text below: some people oppose the chaebol governance from the moral, because they think the blockchain is public property. But the blockchain does not fully comply with the standard of public property (global); block chain is more similar to the common pool resources.

Chain can not buy votes vote and vote for / cannot achieve many (?)

Even if we don’t block the chain as a public property, there is still a kind of argument that chain voting will make block chain governance become fragile, easy to be many “attack vectors” attack. If you want to refute this argument, we must show that the chain chain than the vote does not vote more vulnerable.

For example, before the results of the study show that chain voting block chain may also be vulnerable to bribery bribery attack; attack can use the code in the form of intelligence into the contract. In addition, some people believe that some of the blockchain miners took bribes, to continue for some specific crypto currency mining. (Note: the value chain recently BCH war force the warring parties is high rental force is a good example.)

Therefore, the conclusion is clear: bribery is not the only chain voting system will occur. The chain of bribery seems more feasible, because it is easy to prove that their voters used some special forms of voting, bribes is also very easy to pay bribes, these two things can be used to minimize the trust (trust-minimized) mode. Chain voting on the surface of both sides need to pay bribes more than the chain of trust. At present, whether the chain chain voting voting bribery or bribery, are not very feasible; but with the expansion of the scale of the chain chain block, bribery vote will only become more feasible.

The results of the study

Results: a “loose coupling vote” is very important.

The chain of various issues of governance, but critics in the analysis chain when voting mechanism feasibility, often lack of careful resolution. This paper studies the most important result is that the various plutocracies trend chain voting system, can be alleviated, the loose coupling method is the application of all kinds of voting more or less “”.

Results: two there are significant differences of application level governance “and” governance agreement “.

We believe that the distinction between the two chain management is also very important. The first is the “governance governance agreement”, the Decred, Tezos, EOS and other companies using this kind of governance. The second kind of governance is “application level governance”, MakerDAO, 0x and other projects using this kind of governance. “Risk governance agreement” is significantly greater than the application of “governance”, which means that the attacker by incentives, and the possibility to launch attacks on the application of “bribery governance” is much smaller. In addition, people can still claim the blockchain is public property, but there is no reason to MakerDAO this application level project is regarded as public property. In general, governance against the chain, the comments on the protocol level governance “should be more powerful.


This paper analyzes some of the arguments, the arguments that the chain block chain governance is plutocracies. This paper shows that the chain management of the situation, rather than critics said the situation is often more complex and subtle. To avoid a chain management system fall into plutocracies, is to ensure that the parties to the balance of power in the “loose coupling voting system”, to prevent the system is a hijacking.

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